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Changes in Income Distributionin Poor
AgriculturalNations: Malax i and Madagascar*

Frederic L. Pryor
Swarthmore College
Introduction

MalaWi(formerly Nyasaland) and Madagascarare poor, agricultural
nations in southernAfrica that have chosen very differentstrategiesof
development. Mala i carries a "capitalist" label and has focused its
governmentaldevelopment efforts on the agriculturalsector up to the
early 1980s;Madagascarcarries a "Marxist"label and, in the decade
from 1975 to 1985, has chosen to direct its major attention to the
industrialsector. In some respects, the economic performanceof the
two nations has been very different:for instance, between 1960 and
1986, Mala i had an average annual increase of per capita GDP of
about 1.6%, while Madagascarhad an average annual decrease of
about 1.1%. In other respects, performancewas relativelysimilar.For
instance, both countries experienced wideningdifferentialsof income
and increasingpoverty, but especially Malaci.
In poor agriculturalnations, an increasinginequalityin the distribution of income for the nation as a whole can come about for three
2
reasons.
1. The income inequalitieswithin the urbanor ruralsectors widen. As shown below, the greaterincome differentialsin the ruralsectors of the two countries were the most importantfactors underlying
the overall increasinginequalitiesof income.
2. The relative numberof families increases in the urban sector
(as long as the urban sector accounts for less than half of the population), where average incomes are higher. Althoughsuch a population
movement occurred to a limited extent in both countries, it did not
have an importantimpact on the overall distributionof income.
3. The disparity in average incomes of families in the urbanand
rural sectors widens. In both MalaWiand Madagascar,however, this
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disparity narrowed, primarily because real family incomes in the urban
sector fell considerably.
In this article I examine the available income distribution data,
then turn to the policy variables underlying the intrasectoral and intersectoral income differences, and finally focus on some physical indicators of poverty in order to explore what happened to incomes at one
end of the income distribution.
Basic Trends in the Income Distribution
The tentative nature of data presented below must always be kept in
mind; the estimates are pieced together from a variety of surveys of
family income in different sectors at different times, adjusted whenever
possible to make them comparable. For Madagascar, special problems
arise because the income data are not consistent with the production
data. The estimates designated "A" combine the various income surveys without taking such consistency problems into account, and, as a
result, they probably understate actual income inequality. The estimates labeled "B" are made by adjusting the rural and urban income
data so that the totals roughly equal the relevant national income aggregates; they probably overstate income inequality. The exact methods
of estimation are published at length elsewhere;3 the key estimates are
presented in tables 1 and 2.
The data in table 1 show considerable income inequality in the two
nations and a marked increase in income inequality over time, especially in Malaxi'i. The data in table 2 present overall measures of average family incomes and family income inequalities for particular population groups. Such data also permit us to separate the impact of
intergroup and intragroup differences by setting all incomes in a particular group equal to the group average; such a procedure only works for
those inequality coefficients that are decomposable, that is, the log
variance and the Theil statistics.
Structural Features of Income Inequality
Several features of these estimates immediately draw our attention.
First, in both countries the single most important factor underlying the
overall inequalities of income was the difference in average income
between urban and rural populations. This can be shown by comparing
the income inequality coefficients for the entire economy without adjustments to the hypothetical situation where all incomes in a particular
population group are equal to the mean. In three of the four cases the
inequality coefficients in the latter case accounted for roughly one-half
or more of total income inequalities.
Second, in both countries the inequalities in the rural sector were
considerable, particularly in the later year. It is sometimes claimed that
in the rural sector of developing countries the distribution of income is
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TABLE 1

THE SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME
CUMULATIVE PERCENTAGE

MalaWi
1968/69
1984/85,

CUMULATIVE PERCENT

k)

Estim

OFPOPULATION

Before

After

before

b

ARRANGEDIN ORDER
OF INCREASINGINCOMES

Direct
Taxes

Direct
Taxes

Direct
Taxes

D
T

8.2
18.8
30.9
44.6
53.8
61.1
74.6
100.0

8.6
19.7
32.3
46.4
55.9
63.4
77.4
100.0

3.3
9.5
19.1
34.3
47.6
58.0
75.8
100.0

20
40
60
80
90
95
99
100

SOURCE.-Frederic L. Pryor, "Income Distribution and Economic Development in
Discussion Paper, no. 37 (World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1988), table I-5, and "Income D
Historical Statistics," World Bank Discussion Paper, no. 36 (World Bank, Washington, D
NOTE.-The differences between estimates A and B are explained in the text.
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TABLE 2
INCOME INEQUALITY STATISTICS FOR MALA*I

AND MADAGASCAR

INEQUALITY
COEFFICIENTS

GROUPSOF FAMILIES

Mala i:
1968/69:
Smallholderfamilies
Familieson estates
Families in small towns

Familiesin four majortowns
Total/average
Assumingall incomes in a
group equal to mean of group
1984/85:
Smallholderfamilies
Familieson estates
Familiesin small towns
Families in four major towns
Total/average

AVERAGE
NUMBER TOTAL
INCOME* Gini Theil
(1,000)

885.0
28.0
11.0

86.42 .203 .113
140.31 .187 .093
606.93

.466

.417

Log

variance

.118
.110
.651

42.6
966.5

907.65 .660 .884
130.03 .448 .796

1.494
.317

966.5

130.03 .317 .432

.274

1,252.0 358.2
89.2
425.1
34.2 2,157.1

.453 .348
n.a. n.a.
n.a. n.a.

.607
n.a.
n.a.

98.5
1,473.9

3,235.4
596.2

.621
.599

.776
.944

1.065
.860

1,473.9

596.2

.365

.447

.361

.290

.194

.220

n.a. n.a.

n.a.

Assumingall incomes in a
group equal to mean of group
Madagascar (estimate A):

1962:

Rural

Secondaryurbancenters
Largest six towns

Total/average
Assumingall incomes in a
group equal to mean of group
1980:
Rural sector
Secondary urban centers
Largest seven towns

Total/average
Assumingall incomes in a
group equal to mean of group

1,076.2

60.9

36.6

153.6

98.9

199.3

.466

.806

1,211.7

75.0

.391 .371

.500

.352

1,211.7

75.0

.168 .106

.125

1,542.9
140.5
227.3

192.9
356.2
462.7

.435
.487
n.a.

.329
.399
n.a.

.517
.747
n.a.

1,910.8

237.0

.489 .426

.628

1,910.8

237.0

.154 .065

.096

increases.TheGini
NOTE.-Allof the coefficientsbecomelargerwheninequality
coefficientlies between0.0 and 1.0;the othersare unbounded.
As notedin the disForeachcouncussion,the estimatesfor the two countriesarenot quitecomparable.
overtime.Sourcesarethesameas in
try,however,theresultsareroughlycomparable
table1. n.a. = notavailable.
* Incomein Mala i KwachaforMala i andMalagasy
FrancsforMadagascar.
relatively equal since the average incomes are so close to the starvation
limit. Such an argument-often attributed to Simon Kuznets but found
in earlier literature as well-does not take into account either the fact
that there are a number of relatively wealthy peasants, so that the
distribution has a long tail, or that these data are based on household
income and would be more equal if income per person were the basis of
the calculation.
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In addition, because of the manner in which the Madagascar data
are estimated, the overall inequality coefficients for the two countries
cannot be directly compared without further adjustments.4 When such
adjustments are made (a weighted average of estimates A and B), it
appears that income inequalities in the rural sector of Madagascar were
greater, especially in the earlier year. This occurred because land was
less equally distributed among smallholders in Madagascar than in
Mala i, a feature arising from differences in the land tenure arrangements: in Mala i tenancy was very infrequent and a family could hold
only as much land as it farmed; in Madagascar, the land was more
privatized.5
Finally, Madagascar had a greater overall equality of income, due
primarily to its narrower urban-rural income differentials. As noted,
some incomparabilities exist between the data of the two countries, but
the differences in average incomes in the urban and rural sectors were
too great to be explained by differences in statistical definitions in the
two nations.
Changes over Time
Aside from the increasing inequality of overall income, some other
important temporal changes should be noted. The changes in income
distribution, for instance, were particularly important in the rural sector, which also had the lowest average income; in the urban sector,
income differentials seemed to remain roughly constant. In Madagascar, however, the estimation procedure may have understated any
adverse changes in the urban sector; and, moreover, in the mid-1980s
the income inequalities in the cities undoubtedly increased as unemployment rose and the rice subsidy was removed. Also, the influences
of migration from the low income rural sector to the higher income
urban sector were not important in either country. More specifically,
simulations of the impact of population shift using the data in table 2
made little difference in the calculated inequality coefficients.6
Intrasectoral Income Differences
Urban Sector
In the urban sector I found little evidence that the Mala i government
intervened in a conscious manner to change the distribution of wage
income. The government's basic needs strategy focused more on the
raising of income levels than on distributional issues per se. The wage
control policies focused primary attention on the average wages in
particular sectors, rather than on the structure of wages per se.
In Madagascar the situation was quite different and the most important measures deserve a brief review. In the period from 1977 to
1979 the government took three steps to influence the urban income
distribution: first, it raised the minimum wages in the lowest wage
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categories at a faster rate than the minimum wage in higher categories;
second, it revised the civil service pay scale to favor the lowest paid
workers (and to freeze the pay of the higher civil servants); and third, it
also began to subsidize sales to the urban sector of such basic products
as rice, the main staple and the largest single purchase in the budgets of
the poor. This acted in a progressive manner on the urban income
distribution but had a regressive effect for the income distribution of
the nation as a whole since such subsidies were essentially financed by
the rural sector which received a price lower than a free market price
for its crops (especially those farmers who produced crops for exports). The subsidy on food consumption of the urban population was
eliminated in the mid-1980s as part of the liberalization program, a
policy step particularly painful to the government.
The Malagasy government also implemented a number of other
policies to narrow the income distribution in urban areas, but these
often achieved results opposite to what was intended. For instance, in
the 1980s the government set low prices for edible oils and condensed
milk (two important commodities in the household budgets of the
poor), but this led to a decline of domestic production and their availability to the poor.
Rural Sector
Increases in income inequality within the rural sector-particularly
among smallholders-were the critical factor underlying the overall
increase in income inequality in both nations. Before turning to the
impact of various governmental policies, it is useful to consider for a
moment the impact of diminishing returns to labor on the land, a factor
also leading to greater rural income inequalities. Although both countries experienced a land shortage, they responded in different manners.
In Mala i the average size of a smallholder farm declined markedly from the 1960s through the mid-1980s; there was very little unused
arable land to be found, especially in the most populous southern
region, so the rural economy was operating on the intensive margin.
Since techniques of land intensification were not yet introduced on a
large scale, it seems likely that the same percentage population increase in the three regions (north, central, and south) would drive
average agricultural incomes further down in the southern region
where diminishing returns were more severe than in the other regions;
and, indeed, this appears to have happened.' In Madagascar the average smallholder's farm increased in size, but both land and labor productivity were falling, that is, the rural economy was operating on the
extensive margin and was bringing into production land of increasingly
bad quality. This mechanism slowed to some degree the widening of
regional income inequalities in the rural sector.
Government policies played, I believe, a more important role than
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diminishing returns in influencing the distribution of rural income, and
these measures need careful consideration for each country. The argument can only be made in a qualitative fashion since the available data
do not permit an exact determination of the impact of the various
policies.
Hastings Kamuzu Banda led his country to indepenMalavii.
dence in 1964 and has remained in power ever since. His government
followed an agricultural policy toward the smallholders that might be
labeled (after a similarly oriented policy of the last Russian tsar) a
"wager on the strong," focusing most of the public resources placed in
agriculture on the richest farmers.
Before outlining the way in which such a strategy was implemented, I must emphasize that a wager on the strong is a defensible
development strategy if three conditions are met: if resources channeled to the strong are more productive than if expended on the rest of
the agricultural sector; if there is some trickle-down of the benefits
from the wealthier part of the agricultural sector to the poorer; and if
the poorer part of the agricultural sector is not disadvantaged by other
government policies, by natural conditions, or by its interaction with
the wealthier part of the agricultural sector. Although it lies beyond the
scope of this article to argue these matters in detail, none of the three
conditions were met in Mala i.8 The particular agricultural policies of
the Mala i government have given rise to considerable criticism.
The Mala i government carried out its wager on the strong in a
variety of ways, of which the most important were:
a) In its development budget (roughly, the capital budget), the
government invested from one-half to two-thirds of all resources in
four large-scale integrated development projects. Before the projects
started, three of the four development areas had average net farm
incomes roughly twice as high as the national average; the fourth had
average farm incomes slightly below the national average. Furthermore, within each of the four development areas, the number of
families actually adopting the "technology and credit" package was
less than one-third of the total number of families, so that the governmental funds focused on a relatively small percentage of the total population.
b) The technology and credit package, which the government offered smallholders, required them to use certain agricultural techniques in return for credit to purchase fertilizers, seeds, and other
inputs. Such a package, however, involved the purchasing of large
quantities of fertilizer, and such input amounts were suitable only for
relatively large farms. The seeds were also for a hybrid maize for
export, which was planted only by the richest smallholders. This is
because such hybrid maize did not store well and also did not correspond to local tastes. The poorer smallholders followed a "safety first"
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strategy by first planting enough of the local maize to feed their
families; only those with considerable extra land would plant the hybrid maize to the extent that they were able to take advantage of the
technology and credit package. It should not be surprising, therefore,
that most credit went to the wealthier smallholders. In the most recent
long-term plan, this situation was noted and policies were planned for
the late 1980s which would lead to a much wider distribution of credit
and a change in the package so as to be more suitable for the smallholders with relatively small farm areas.9
c) The poorer farmers were forced to sell all of their export
crops as well as most of their domestic crops destined for the urban
areas to the Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation
(ADMARC), a monopsonistic purchasing parastatal. Over the decade
of the 1970s ADMARC paid an increasingly lower percentage of the
world market price. A particular set of richer farmers-designated
"master farmers"-were permitted to sell their export crops at world
market prices and receive considerably higher prices. They also received a priority in the supply of farm inputs, whenever these were
scarce because of foreign exchange shortages, and special credits.
d) Although Mala i had a relatively impressive network of extension workers, this service did not reach certain subsectors of the smallholding sector, for example, female-headed households, which made
up about one-third of all rural households in the most populous region
and which were often the poorest households. Agricultural research
was also not oriented toward the problems faced by the poorest smallholders.
e) In its educational policies, the Mala i government placed little
emphasis on increasing the primary school enrollment. This disadvantaged the poor families in the rural sector and contributed to income
inequality.
Mala i was one of the few African countries to pursue in a conscious fashion a development strategy favoring the agricultural sector.
The government, however, provided the greatest help to two subsectors: the richest smallholders and the public and private estates. The
estates were aided by generous credit from state banks, a method used
by the government to circumvent the bureaucracy in the Ministry of
Agriculture. The gamble on estate production paid off since such production was the leading sector underlying Mala i's economic growth
during the 1970s.
Although many have criticized Mala i's emphasis on estates,
such policies did not have a direct effect on the distribution of income
within the smallholder sector; the indirect effects were minor.10It was
the wager on the strong that led to a widening of rural income differentials. Mala i thus serves as an important counterexample to the oft-
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made but careless generalizationthat a developmentstrategybased on
agricultureper se leads to a more equal distributionof income.
Madagascar. In Madagascarthe situationwas ratherdifferent.
After independence in 1960 the government of Philibert Tsiranana
placed a considerable share of its development budget in the rural
sector. It followed, however, a wager on the strong strategy, with
emphasis on certain integrateddevelopmentprojectsand with government aid and credit directed primarilyat the richest smallholdersand
the estates.
The government of Gabriel Ramanantsoa(1972-75) attempted
both to increase the share of governmentinvestmentin the ruralareas
and to reverse the emphasis on aiding the richest farmers. Some observers have argued that duringthis period there was a considerable
change in the village leadership and the distributionof such governmentalaid, with more aid going to farmsof smallersize; these matters,
however, cannot be easily confirmed.
The socialist governmentof DidierRatsiraka(1975to the present)
followed a much different development strategy, decreasing investment in the ruralareas and increasinginvestmentin industry.In 197879 it inaugurateda programof "invest to the hilt" (a Malagasyversion
of the Chinese Great Leap Forward),which had catastrophicresults:a
quintuplingof the foreign debt, a dramaticdecline in per capita GDP,
and a chronic balance-of-paymentscrisis lasting for a decade. During
the Ratsirakaperiod up to the mid-1980s, the following policies influenced the distributionof income in the smallholdersector.
a) After 1975 agriculturalcredit was channeled primarilyto the
richer smallholdersand estates, especially since several programsoffering credit to smallerfarms were cut back or dropped.
b) Duringits firstdecade the Ratsirakagovernmentdivertedfunds
for maintenanceof the roads to other purposes. Given the minorimportance of railroadsand other means of transportationof crops, this
meant that the majorimpactof the breakdownof transportationfell on
areas far removed from the cities; and those areas also had the lowest
per capita incomes.
c) The Ratsirakagovernment turned the internalterms of trade
against the ruralsector so that real agriculturalprices were lower than
before." This meant that those farmerswho relied primarilyon their
sales to official governmentalpurchasingagencies received less for
their products; they were, in large part, smallholderswith relatively
little to sell, that is, the lower income smallholders.
d) The Ramanantsoagovernment began nationalizingthe crop
purchasing companies, and the process was completed by the Ratsirakagovernment.As an inadvertentresult, therewas a breakdownof
markets. This can be seen by examiningthe coefficient of variationof
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market prices for various agricultural products in the 17 subprefectures: the statistic shows a tripling of the weighted coefficient of variations between the early and the mid-1970s. Important parallel markets
for foodstuffs developed in the cities, and those most able to take
advantage of the high prices (often more than double the official prices)
were usually the richest farmers, who had the resources to bribe or
purchase trucking services.
e) The foreign exchange scarcity induced by the overvalued exchange rate made it difficult for many to obtain the necessary agricultural inputs such as insecticides and fertilizers, not to mention consumer goods. This development also benefited the richest farmers
since they had the working capital for payments to obtain the scarce
inputs or to pay parallel market prices for consumer goods.
f) Although the various Malagasy governments made valient efforts to achieve 100%enrollment rates in the primary schools, illiteracy
did not fall the fastest in the poorest provinces. Further, during the
decade after the 1970s, graduates of various schools had considerable
difficulties in finding jobs commensurate with their education. Thus,
education did not appear to narrow income differences, at least during
the period under investigation.
Changes in the Ratio of Urban and Rural Incomes
A very important feature of the income structure in both countries was
the very great difference between average incomes in the urban and
rural sectors, and the narrowing of such differentials over time. This
has acted to lower overall income inequalities, that is, to counteract the
impact of the widening income differentials in the rural areas.
Although the differences beween the two countries appear considerable, they are due in part to the nature of the data. If we adjust the
Malagasy income data to make them more consistent with production
data (i.e., estimate B), the urban-rural differences become twice as
great (as estimate A). Furthermore, the Mala i data include expatriates in the urban sector; the Madagascar data exclude them. If the data
were made comparable in this manner, the Madagascar ratio of average
urban to rural incomes would undoubtedly be still higher.
The differences between urban and rural incomes between the two
countries are not just statistical artifacts but also reflect some real
contrasts. During colonial times the French farmers in Madagascar
were much more widespread through the countryside than the English
were in the Nyasaland colony. In order to aid these colonists, the
French also invested considerably in rural infrastructure, which, to a
certain extent, aided the Malagasy smallholders as well. In Mala i,
governmental investment in the rural sector was relatively small until
after the Second World War.
From the data presented in table 2 this urban/rural income differ-
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ence can be studied from various aspects. Of greatest importanceis
that both countries reveal a narrowingof the urban/ruralincome gap
because real urbanincomes fell between the 1960sand the 1980s.
MalaVi

In Mala i between 1968/69 and 1984/85, average smallholderfamily
income increased roughly 6%, while such income in the majortowns
declined about 25%. Among smallholdersit is noteworthy that real
family income from wages and salaries (representingoff-farmemployment) declined about 42%, largely because the part-timejobs in the
urbanareas previously held by smallholderswere now being taken by
ruraldwellers movingpermanentlyto the informalsector in the towns.
Underlying this fall in urban income was a decrease in the real
wage. From 1968through1985averagereal wages in the modernsector
fell at an average annual rate of about 3.8% a year. Several mechanisms appear to account for this dramaticdecline.
Rise ofprofits at the expense ofwages.

Over the period 1968-85,

the share of profits in the national income increased considerably,
while the share of wages fell. In the decade before independence,the
share of propertyincome from the modernsector in the total national
income fluctuatedbetween 5%and 10%;afterindependenceit rose to a
high of 23% in 1977, before falling to 15%in 1979, the last year for
which such data are available. A Stolper-Samuelson-Rybczynski
mechanism appears to have been in operation, that is, capital- (and
land-) intensive productionincreased at a faster rate than more laborintensive production, which raised the relative share of property income in the total national income. More specifically, agricultural
exports rose faster than the GDP; the Central Bank maintainedthe
exchange rate at roughly the equilibriumlevel; the relative prices of
traded goods (crops) rose in comparisonto nontradedgoods and services; incomes in the sectors selling these export goods increased;and
real wages in the sector producingnontradedgoods (which includes
many urbanworkers) fell.12 The fall in the wage share led to a fall in
urbanincomes since the increase in total income in the economy was
not sufficientlygreat to offset such changes.
Composition of the urban labor force.

Part of the fall in real

wages for the economy as a whole can also be attributedto a shiftin the
composition of the laborforce so that the lower paid agriculturalworkers (estate workers) constituted a larger share of employmentin the
modern sector. In the urban sector alone, however, real wages have
experiencedan averageannualfall of 3.2%;moreover,therewas a shift
towardjobs paying lower than averagewages."3 For instance,between
1969and 1976, three-quartersof the newly created private-sectorjobs
were for unskilledjobs at wage levels below the averagewage; such a
composition effect lowers averagewages over time, even if real wages
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for every specific job remained the same. Scattered evidence also suggests that as Mala ians began to fill high income jobs previously held
by European expatriates, the salaries of these jobs were also reduced.
Although adequate wage data to analyze the question in detail are not
available, I suspect that real wages for most specific jobs probably
declined over the period, although at a relatively slow rate.
Otherfactors. Unemployment per se was not responsible for any
fall in average real wages, since the rate of joblessness appears low.14
Mala i had a considerable shortage of skilled workers, and, indeed,
there was a relative rise of wages and salaries of those with more
education in the years 1966-77. The joblessness that occurred was
primarily among the unskilled, and this undoubtedly acted to pull down
real wages at the low end of the wage scale. Aggressive actions by the
labor unions to prevent this fall in real wages was also discouraged by
the government.
Madagascar
In Madagascar between 1962 and 1980, average family incomes in the
rural sector remained roughly the same while such incomes (excluding
expatriates) in the major towns declined about 27%. 5 Real wages in the
modern sector fell throughout the entire independence period. From
1960 and 1970 real average annual wages in the private sector declined
slowly-about 0.8% a year; and from 1966 through 1984, average annual wages of industrial workers fell faster-at about 2.3% a year.
Several contrasts can be drawn with Mala i.
Rise of profits at the expense of wages. Although profit data are
not available, it does not appear that this factor was very important.
After 1975 considerable nationalization took place and the parastatal
sector was subsidized, rather than serving as a source of profits. Furthermore, the Stolper-Samuelson-Rybczynski mechanism was not operative because foreign trade increased more slowly than the GDP and
the relative prices of tradables did not greatly change in comparison to
nontradables.
Composition of the urban labor force. Employment in the modern sector increased during the period from 1960 through 1984 at
roughly 2.3% per year, which was considerably lower than the 6.1%
annual rise in population in the urban areas. Since the modern sector in
the countryside was not an important source of employment growth,
the urban informal sector absorbed the new labor. Although the income
of those in the informal sector is not included as wages, it had a depressing impact on the lowest urban wages. Within the formal urban
sector, the fastest growing segment was the government sector, and in
recent years the government raised wages at a much lower rate than
inflation in order to reduce the government deficit.
Other factors. Unemployment was much higher in Madagascar
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than in Mala i. For instance, in 1980 the unemployedin the urban
areas registered as seeking work amounted to over 8% of the labor
force outside of agriculture;and from 1970to the mid-1980s,the number of those registered as unemployedtripled. Actual unemployment
was, of course, much higher than was registeredunemployment.Antananarivo,the largest city, for instance, had an unemploymentrate of
more than 30%in the early 1980s.16 Such unemploymentexercised a
downwardpressure on wages.
A Note on Poverty
To what extent did the growth-or decline-of per capita income influence the income of the poorest segment of the population?One
method of studying the problem is to take as the "poverty line" the
income of families in the fortiethpercentilein an early year and then to
determine the percentage of families with incomes (adjusted for
changes in prices) below this poverty line in a later year. Using this
procedurewe find that the percentageof those in poverty increasedin
both countries, especially Mala i.17Contraryto expectationsbased on
general considerationsof the natureof economic growth, poverty increased more in the country with the highest growth of per capita
income.
This rather startling conclusion does not, however, correspond
with more casual evidence of the very poorestfromboth countries.For
instance, there is less visual evidence of humanmisery in Mala i than
in Madagascar.18 Also, unless the particularstatistic used to calculate
the overall inequalityof income places particularlyheavy weighton the
lowest income levels, it is by no means certainthat comparisonsof the
entire income distributionsof the two countrieswould yield the same
results as comparisonsof the truly destitute.
Given the uncertainnature of income data at lower levels in any
country, comparisonsof poverty can be carriedout best by examining
a series of physical indicatorsof well-beingthat are particularlysensitive to real incomes of the poorest segment of the population. Such
data suggest that the extent of povertydoes not appearvery differentin
the two countries;in other words, the inequalitystatisticspresentedin
the discussion above do not capturean importantaspect of the income
distribution.The physical data also reveal differenttrends over time.
Infant Mortality

Althoughat independenceMala i and Madagascarhad quite different
rates of infant mortality,these rates appearto have convergedby the
mid-1980s.
In Mala i infant mortalitydeclined from about 204 per thousand
in 1967, to 176 per thousand in 1977, to roughly 160 per thousandin
1982.19This does not necessarily indicatea fall in poverty as measured
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by income since infant mortality has decreased in many African na-

tions where poverty has not decreased; it does, however, show an
increase in physical well-being.
For Madagascar information about infant mortality rates is much
more uncertain.20 For 1975, estimates range from 68 per thousand (the
official census datum) to 160 per thousand (a rather uncertain calculation based on use of fertility rates and age distribution data). In later
years similar data uncertainties occur and, for 1985, my own estimate
is that infant mortality was roughly 150 per thousand, although this
may be on the high side. There is considerable evidence that infant
mortality rates increased from the late 1970s through the mid-1980s,
only part of which can be attributed to improvements in the system of
collecting mortality information.
Birth Weight
Aggregative information on the birth weight of infants is often used as a
measure of the nutritional status of the women bearing the children.21
In Madagascar, a nationwide sample survey in 1984 revealed that
14.4% of the infants had a birth weight of less than 2,500 grams; smaller
scale studies record considerably higher percentages. In Mala i only
partial studies are available; one survey of all babies born in
Malavi
hospitals and health centers in July 1964 (admittedly only a fraction of
total newborn babies) showed that 16.5% had birth weights lower than
2,500 grams. The difference in these percentages between the two
countries appears significant; however, the quality of the data are poor,
and not too much emphasis should be placed on such results.
Measurements of Weight and Height of Children
Anthropometric data of children revealing undernourishment are increasingly used as measurements of absolute poverty.22 The undernutrition data suggest few important differences in the two countries.
For Mala data are available from an impressive national survey
vi
of children of smallholders, which was carried out in conjunction with
the 1980/81 National Sample Survey of Agriculture. For Madagascar a
considerable number of smaller scale studies have been carried out on
the topic, and for table 3 I have used data from three recent studies,
which, unfortunately, covered relatively prosperous areas. It is likely,
therefore, that a nationwide study would show greater undernutrition.
Also included in table 3 is similar information for other countries so
that an international perspective can be gained.
A weight/height ratio smaller than 90% (or roughly 2 standard
deviations) of the international norm reflects acute undernutrition. Using this criterion, Mala i and Madagascar probably had roughly the
same degree of acute undernutrition and, moreover, a higher degree
than most other African nations. For Mala i, some expected differ-
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TABLE 3
EVIDENCE ON UNDERNUTRITION

Countryand Date
of Survey
rural, 1980/81:
MalaCWi

Ages in
Months

Acute Undernutrition
(<80% median
weight/height)
(%)

0-60

North

---

Central
South
Total
Madagascar,1984:
Antsiraberural
Antsirabeurban
Toamasinaurban
Cameroon,1978
Egypt, 1978
Lesotho, 1976
Liberia, 1976
Senegal (Sine-Saloumregion), 1982
SierraLeone, 1978
Swaziland, 1983
Togo, 1977

1.4*
1.8*
2.8*
2.3*

0-60
0-60
0-60
3-60
6-72
3-60
0-60
0-60
3-60
3-60
6-72

.8
.6
3.5
1.0
.6
1.1
1.6
4.4
3.0
.4
2.0

data for MalaWirefer only to childrenfrom smallholderfamiliesand ar
SOURCES.-All
after the main harvest. The detailed data and sources are presented in FredericL. Pry
MalaWi:Some HistoricalStatistics, WorldBankDiscussionPaper,no. 36 (WorldBank,W
sources, as well as the results of other nutritionalsurveys, are discussed in FredericL. Pr
Madagascar:Some HistoricalStatistics," WorldBankDiscussionPaper,no. 37 (WorldBa
countriesare drawnfrom surveys carriedout by the Centersfor Disease Control(CDC)in
School of PublicHealth. They were suppliedby Nancy Binkinof the CDC and come from
Swaziland," Journal of Tropical Pediatrics 33 (February 1987): 35-42.

NOTE.-The measurementsrefer to WorldHealth Organizationnorms. The dash in t
available.
* Originallypresentedin terms of standarddeviationsfrom the normedmedian;now
t The samplefor this statistic includes only childrenfrom 3 to 60 monthsof age.
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ences appear when comparisons are made before and after the harvest.
Furthermore, the highest acute undernutrition occurred in the southern
region where family incomes are lowest and land scarcity is greatest.
The height/age norm has some problems as a measure of chronic
undernourishment, especially because of the controversy concerning
the cutoff point to designate undernutrition. Although 90% (about 2
standard deviations) is used in table 3, some experts place the cutoff
point at 85% or 3 standard deviations, which would reduce the count of
chronically undernourished roughly by half.
By this measure both Mala 'i and Madagascar had a high degree of
chronic undernutrition, about 50%-60% of their children. This appears
much higher than in other African nations and, given the relatively low
acute undernutrition, such results seem rather peculiar. To interpret
these data, two conjectures can be offered: either the children in the
two countries suffered from repeated spells of illness, which meant that
they might not have been acutely undernourished at any single time but
that the long run impact of such sickness led to a cumulative stunting,
or the ages of the Mala ian and Malagasy children were considerably
overestimated. Lacking detailed data, a definitive resolution of this
interpretative problem cannot be given.
The weight/age norm is the most popular method of measuring
chronic protein-calorie undernutrition. It is also, however, the most
ambiguous of the three measurements for several reasons. It is quite
sensitive to estimates of age; and among a population with considerable illiteracy, age estimates in months are often rather uncertain. Furthermore, different investigators define undernutrition at different
levels-from 75% to 90% of the World Health Organization (WHO)
norms. Moreover, the presence of edema may make weight misleadingly high. Finally, children with low weight for age do not necessarily
have marasmus but may be short for their age so that their low weight
is appropriate for their low height, a situation that seemed to be the
case in Mala i.23
These weight/age data suggest that about one-third of the children
in Mala i and Madagascar were undernourished. These figures are
somewhat higher than for the other African countries, but much lower
than for some developing countries elsewhere. Weight/age data for
other areas from other, less complete, studies (which are not shown in
the table) suggest that undernutrition is somewhat greater in Madagascar than in Mala i.24
In sum, the anthropometric data suggest that the critical problem
in both Mala i and Madagascar was chronic rather than acute undernutrition. Further, there appeared few important differences between
the two countries: data for Antsirabe (a wealthy area) suggest lower
undernutrition than in Mala i, while the data from Toamasina (a
poorer area) suggest the reverse.
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Times series for an assessment of trends are considerablymore problematic, and only the infant mortality data permit comparisons between the two countries.25
The decrease in infant mortalityin Malaxi, as noted above, does
not provide unambiguousevidence about a decline in poverty. The
increase in infant mortality in Madagascarstrongly suggests an increase in absolute poverty, since the infant mortality rate is highly
sensitive to changes in income of the very poorest. This conclusion is
supportedby scattered data showing that in the 1980san increasingly
higher percentage of children admitted to certain hospitals showed
Starvationalso appearsto have increasedin
signs of undernutrition.26
recent years althoughlittle reliableinformationon the subjectis available. For instance, the opposition leader, Monja Jaona, noted in a
speech in October 1986that about47,000people had recentlydiedfrom
hunger in three areas in the southernpart of the island. The government officially denied the number but did accept the fact that some
such deaths had occurred.
The increase of poverty in Madagascarwas due in greatest measure to those governmentaleconomic policies that led to a reductionin
average income following the fall of the Tsirananagovernment. In
particular, the shift in relative prices against the agriculturalsector
discouragedagriculturalproductionfor the market.The "invest to the
hilt" program, the overvalued exchange rate, other foreign trade
policies, and governmentalexpendituresdirected toward the maintenance of large armed forces rather than for other purposes led to a
general shortage of inputs.
Growthand IncomeDistribution:Some Conclusions
It was certainly not inevitable that economic growth be accompanied
by widening income differentialsin Malaxi. The last decade of the
colonial years in that country provided some evidence that, given the
right set of incentives, productionand incomes in the smallholdersector could grow rapidly. It was also not inevitable that Madagascar
experience both an economic decline and an increase in income differentials. In both countries the major cause of overall increases in income inequality can be traced to a widening of income differentials
among smallholderscaused by a variety of policy failures,almost all of
which were correctable.
Some general conclusions that have relevance for other nations
can be drawn from these comparisonsof Mala i and Madagascar.
1. In discussions about the relationshipof economic growth and
income distributionin developing countries, too much attention has
focused on the urban sector. In poor agriculturalcountries such as
Mala i and Madagascar,income changes within the rural sector or
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between the rural and urban sectors have been more important determinants of the inequality of income. Furthermore, the mechanism proposed by Simon Kuznets that linked economic growth, the transfer of
workers from the rural sector to the urban sector, and the increasing
inequality in the overall distribution of income does not appear very
important in explaining what happened in these nations.27
2. Governmental emphasis on agricultural growth does not necessarily insure that rural incomes, especially of smallholders, will dramatically rise or that such incomes will become more equal. The
Malax i experience shows that such agricultural growth can be focused
primarily on the estate sector and the richest smallholders, so that
income inequalities in the smallholder sector will widen. Unfortunately, the obvious fact that the agricultural sector is not homogeneous
seems overlooked by many who make facile generalizations about development strategies and income distribution.
3. Government policies that have nothing to do with the distribution of income per se can have extremely important influences on
income inequalities. In both countries administrative procedures concerning credit and the sale of agricultural inputs have acted to favor the
richer farmers. In Mala i the two-tier agricultural pricing policies have
widened income differentials. In Madagascar the nationalization of
crop purchasing and sales to farmers had the same result; in addition,
neglect of transportation maintenance led to a breakdown of rural markets, which acted to widen income differentials.
4. The tax system has an important role to play in the distribution
of income. As shown in table 1, the incidence of direct and indirect
taxes in Mala i was mildly progressive but no such incidence was
observed in Madagascar. If, however, account is taken of the implicit
taxes on the rural sector through low prices offered by monopsonistic
crop purchasing agencies, the impact of the fiscal system in both nations was regressive since it placed a burden on the poorest segment of
the population, the smallholders. This is true of many countries in
many poor agricultural nations. In such cases an equilibrium exchange
rate, which would raise the market prices for agriculture, would probably do more to narrow income inequalities than any other single set of
measures. Unfortunately, politics in most developing nations are
primarily urban matters since the rural areas are difficult to organize
for political purposes. Such urban bias in the tax structure, while regrettable, is not surprising.
5. Commonly used overall measures of income inequality tell us
little about the relative importance or behavior of poverty in an absolute sense. For instance, although Mala i had a greater income inequality than Madagascar, the various health indicators suggest that
the two nations had roughly the same degree of poverty. Overall measures also show a greater increase in income inequality in Mala i than
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in Madagascar;as measuredby infant mortalityrates, however, poverty appearedto increase more in Madagascar.
6. Many direct measures to redistributeincome are unlikely to
achieve their desired ends. Given the fiscal constraints facing both
governments, the extent to which redistributionof income can be carried out through the expenditure side of the governmentbudget is
highly limited.
The detailed study of income distributiontrends in the poorest
nations of the world is importantin orderto design policies, especially
concerningagriculture,that can bringaboutboth growthand equity. A
beginninghas been made by others,28 and in this study I have tried to
investigate other aspects of the problem, especially with regard to
policies that have hitherto received relatively little attention. Such a
task, of course, is difficult, for it involves both piecing together relatively poor quality data and linkingtrends in income distributionwith
particularpolicies. Such linkages can only be determinedby microstudies of the ways in which such policies have workedout in particular countries;and the majoranalyticproblemis to separatethe impact
of differenteconomic policies.
In addition, this type of case study evidence would probablynot
be of sufficientquality and quantityto carry out a sophisticatedcrosscountry or intracountrystatistical analysis or to sort out unambiguously the major causal factors involved. Nevertheless, a sufficient
amountof systematic case study materialslinkingpolicies and income
distributiontrends can be gatheredto generatepresumptivecases for
or against certain types of governmentalmeasuresin particularsituations, especially if such evidence buttresses existing theoreticalevidence. Theoreticalevidence alone is often disregardedby policymakers because it is difficult for them to gain a clear understandingof
abstract relationships.
In sum, the lists of factors that influenceincome distributionpresented in this and other studies provide the bones for a useful analytic
skeleton. For such work to have an impact on policy, we need to
investigate more closely a greater variety of these bones and, moreover, to provide them with more flesh.
Notes
* This research was financed by the World Bank for its
Comparative
Projecton the Political Economy of Poverty, Equity, and Growth,which was
directed by Deepak Lal, Hla Myint, and George Psacharopoulos.For comments on previous drafts of this article I thankJonathanKydd, Guy Pourcet,
Zora Pryor, and LarryWestphal,as well as fellow participantsof the research
project. The WorldBank does not endorseany of my evidence or conclusions,
and I alone am responsiblefor any errors.Please note thatfor both countriesI
am focusing on the period from independencein the early or mid-1960sto the
mid-1980s. The discussion is in the past tense, since both economies have
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experienced considerablestructuralchanges since then. Also, note that one
adjectivalform of Madagascaris Malagasy.
1. All growth rates in this essay are calculatedby fittingan exponential
curve to time series. The raw data come from Frederic L. Pryor, "Income
Distributionand Economic Developmentin Madagascar:Some HistoricalStatistics" (hereafter"MadagascarHS"), WorldBank Discussion Paper, no. 37
(WorldBank, Washington,D.C., 1988),app. E, and "IncomeDistributionand
Economic Development in Mala ii: Some Historical Statistics" (hereafter
"Malaii HS"), WorldBank Discussion Paper,no. 36 (WorldBank, Washington, D.C., 1988),app. E. Accordingto the recent calculationsof RobertSummers and Alan Heston, "A New Set of InternationalComparisonsof Real
Productand Price Level Estimatesfor 130 Countries,1950-1985,"Reviewof
Income and Wealth34 (March1988):1-25, the per capitaGDP'sof Mala ii and
Madagascarin 1980were, respectively, $417 and $589.
2. These ideas drawdeeply upon the approachof GaryS. Fields, Poverty,
Inequality,and Development(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1975),
who noted that "without exception the results emerge that variationswithin
sectors or regions are much more importantin accountingfor inequalitythan
variationsbetweensectors" (p. 115).This does not appeartruein a static sense
for either country;however, it does describe the trends of income for both.
3. "MadagascarHS," app. I, and "Mala i HS," app. I.
4. Estimate B for Madagascaris considerablymore comparableto the
Mala ii data than estimate A; unfortunately,estimate B could not be madefor
the later year.
5. For the smallholdersector in Mala i, the Gini coefficientsof planted
landper householdwere .369 and .381 in 1968/69and 1984/85,respectively(per
family member,these Gini coefficientswere, respectively, .294 and .296). For
the smallholdersector in Madagascar,the Gini coefficient of total land per
householdwas .445 in 1962;and the Ginicoefficientfor plantedlandperhousehold was .380 in 1984/85.These datacome fromFredericL. Pryor,Mala~tiand
Madagascar (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, 1990,in press), appendix,unrevised table A-2.
6. Althoughurbanizationincreasedin both Malaii and Madagascar,the
rates were considerablyless than many other developingcountrieshave experienced. In Mala ii, between 1966 and 1977, the total populationgrew at an
average annual rate of 2.9%, while populationin the urban areas increased
somewherebetween 4.7%and 8.0%. In Madagascar,between 1966and 1985,
the populationgrew at an averagerate of 2.5%, while populationin the urban
areas was increasingat a rate of 6.1%. In both countries,the urbanpopulation
increased somewhatfaster in the smallerurbancenters thanin the largecities
(where average incomes were relatively higher). The data come from
"MadagascarHS," app. A, and "Mala i HS," app. A. The simulationsmentioned in the text involve recalculatingthe inequalitycoefficientswith different
assumptionsabout the populationin variousgroups.
7. Regionalincome datafor both countriesare presentedin Pryor,Malaid
and Madagascar, appendix, unrevisedtable I-1.
8. This is arguedin detail in ibid.
9. In the past, smallholderswere often reluctantto form a cooperativeto
obtain credit and purchasefertilizerbecause all would be responsiblefor the
debts of a single individual.The discussion of the proposed changes in the
coming decade is found in Mala i, Officeof the Presidentand Cabinet,Statement of Development Policies, 1987-1996 (Zomba: Government Printer, 1988).

Among other things, the plan arguedthat fertilizershould be sold in smaller
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sacks so that it could be purchasedby smallholderswith relativelysmallholdings.
10. I have arguedthis in greaterdetail in Mala~i and Madagascar.
11. The data mentioned in this and the following paragraphcome from
ibid., chap. 12.
12. This mechanism is spelled out more completely by Deepak Lal,
"Stolper-Samuelson-Rybczynskiin the Pacific: Real Wages and Exchange
Rates in the Philippines, 1956-78," Journal of Development Economics 21

(April 1986): 181-204.
13. Katherine Sierra, "MalaCWi:
EmploymentAspects of Economic Development," WorldBank Report 3453-MAI(WorldBank, Washington,D.C.,
1981).
14. MalaWi, National Statistical Office, Mala~i Population Census, 1977:

Analytical Report (Zomba:GovernmentPrinter, 1984), p. 167, reportedthat
unemploymentamountedto about4.8%of the economicallyactive in the urban
sector, and 1.9%of the economicallyactive in the ruralsector. A smaller-scale
survey, which is reportedby KatherineSierra,MalaZi:EmploymentAspects
of Economic Development, WorldBank ReportNo. 3453-MAI(Washington,
D.C., 1981), pp. 17-20 and was carried out in Blantyre in 1972, shows a
similarly low unemploymentrate: 3.7% of the labor force, mostly among
poorly educated workers. Data to supportother argumentsin this paragraph
come from "MalaWiHS" (n. 1 above), table J-3. It is noteworthythat in the
late 1960s, according to Robert A. Jones and Roger J. Robinson, "Income
Distributionand Development:Rhodesiaand MalaWiCompared,"Rhodesian
Journal of Economics 10 (June 1976):91-103, SouthernRhodesia had even
greater inequalitiesof wages and salaries than did MalaWi,even thoughin a
relative sense it had a much greaterpool of skilled labor on which to draw.
Therefore,some of these urbanincome inequalitieswere due less to education
than to nonmarketforces.
15. The data on wages and the laborforce are very scatteredand incomplete. The data used in this discussion come from "MadagascarHS" (n. 1
above), sec. H.
16. An estimate of unemploymentin Antananarivois presentedin United
Nations InternationalChildren'sEmergencyFund(UNICEF), SituationAnalysis of the Child in Madagascar (Nairobi: UNICEF, 1984), p. 12, which is said

to be low, since underemploymentis not included.Unfortunately,no source is
cited for their estimate. Unemploymentdatain Madagascarare quitefragmentary. Such data are not presented in the 1966 census, and the claim by
Madagascar,Institutnationalde la statistiqueet de la recherche6conomique
(INSRE), Recensement 1975, sdrie itudes et analyse: Analyse de donnies
socio-dconomiques, milieu urbain (Antananarivo: INSRE, n.d.), p. 17, of an

urbanunemploymentof only 15,090 seems highly underestimated,since it is
little higherthan those registeredas looking for work in that year.
17. Using data from tables I-4 and I-9 from "MalaWiHS" and employing
graphicalinterpolationmethods, it appearsthat familiesin the fortiethpercentile had an annual income of roughly MK 70.5 in 1968/69(MK = Mala i
Kwacha). In 1984/85, this income correspondedin real terms to an annual
income of MK 333, which was roughlythe income of a family in the sixtieth
percentile. Using data from tables I-4 and I-8 from "MadagascarHS" (estimate A), it appearsthat in 1962familiesin the fortiethpercentilehad an annual
income of roughlyFMG 47,400 (MalagasyFrancs). In 1980this income corresponded in real terms to an annualincome of about FMG 146,400,which was
roughlythe income of a family in the forty-fifthpercentile.The estimates for
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both countriesare particularlysensitiveto the assumptionsmadein calculating
changes in average incomes of smallholders.Given the rough nature of the
data, it is best to use caution in interpretingthese quantitativeresults in a
qualitativefashion.
18. For instance, I found no evidence in MalaWiof groupsof people living
on the food at the garbagedumps, a phenomenondescribedin vivid detailfor
Madagascar by Martine Camacho, Les poubelles de la survie: La dicharge

municipalede Tananarive(Paris:l'Harmattan,1986).The quantitativeextent
of the poverty problemis difficultto determinein eithercountry,since neither
the Malaii nor the Malagasygovernmentshave publishedany extensive studies on the subject. Mala ii has no "official"poverty limit and in my interview
with him, PresidentBandaquicklydismissedthe suggestionthatpovertyin his
nation had increased (Mala ii, April 22, 1987). The Malagasygovernmentis
more conscious of the problem,particularlyfor the urbanareas, and has tried
to gain some idea of its magnitude.Unfortunately,the governmentdoes not
appearto have followed a consistent approachand calculationsof the level of
"absolute poverty" for a family have varied over the'yearsfrom about FMG
24,000 to FMG 54,000 per month (in constant 1985FMG). More specifically,
for a family of two persons this limit (currentprices) was FMG 13,000 and
FMG28,000per monthin 1981and 1985,respectively.(Madagascar,Ministbre
des travaux publics, Schema directeur du grand Antananarivo: Projet de rapport final de synthise, Project MAG 82/011 [Antananarivo:Ministbredes

travauxpublics, 1985]).A differentmonthlypoverty line declaredthe level to
be FMG 9,317 in 1971; FMG 13,658 in 1975; and FMG 15,000 in 1977.
(Madagascar, Direction g6n6rale au plan, Revenues des minages urbains et
satisfaction des besoins fondamentaux d Madagascar, Etudes techniques du

plan, no. 22 [Antananarivo:Directiong6n6raleau plan, 1979]).An interesting
qualitativediscussion of poverty in Madagascaris by JeanClaudeRouveyran,
La logique des agricultures de transition (Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose, 1972).

19. These data on infant mortalitycome from "Mala i HS," table J-5.
Mala i, Statistical Organization, Mala~ti Family Formation Survey, 1984

(Zomba:GovernmentPrinter,1987),places the infantmortalityin 1983at 154
per thousand.
20. Variousestimatesof infantmortality,includingmy own, are discussed
in much more detail in "MadagascarHS," sec. J. Some data on risingmortality, fetal, and neonatal mortalityfrom 1978 through 1984 are presented by
World Bank, "Madagascar:Populationand Health Sector Review," Report
no. 6446-MAG(WorldBank, Washington,D.C., 1986),app. 2. Some annual
data, which refer to the numberof malnourishedchildren, can be found in
C61lestine Rabemiafala, Contribution d evaluation de l'dtat nutritionnel des
enfants malagasy de moins de 6 ans d travers le complexe materno-infantile de
Tsaralalana (Ville d'Antananarivo) (These, Doctorat de medicine, Universit6

de Madagascar,Antananarivo,1984),p. 445.
21. The MalaWidata come from Mala i, Minister of Health, World
Health Organization (WHO), and UNICEF, Report of the Joint Program Review of Maternal and Child Health (Lilongwe: Minister of Health, WHO, and

UNICEF, 1986),p. 46. The Madagascardata come from WHO, Study of the
Epidemiological Aspects of Breast-Feeding

in Madagascar,

Project 62/

MAFA/WHO,PreliminaryReport (Antananarivo:WHO, n.d.). The statistics
reportedin these two sources are considerablyhigherthan those reportedby
UNICEF, The State of the World's Children 1986 (London: Oxford University

Press, 1986)-12% for Mala i, 10%for Madagascar.
22. The discussion of measurementsof undernutritionin this section is
based on CharlotteG. Neumann, "ReferenceData," in DerrickB. Jelliffeand
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E. F. Patrice Jelliffe, eds., Human Nutrition: A Comprehensive Treatise (New

York: Plenum, 1979), pp. 299-327; and Derrick B. Jelliffe, Assessment of
Nutritional Status of the Community, Monograph vol. 53 (Geneva: WHO,

1966);and conversations with Nancy Binkin (Swarthmore,Pa., 1988), nutrition specialist of the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta, Georgia. By
restrictingthe sample to childrenunder five, the influenceof racialfactors is
minimized;most well-nourishedchildrenin all countries have the same age
specific height-weightpatternsuntil their sixtieth month, a hypothesis explicitly confirmedin a special study of Malaji (unfortunatelyno such study is
available for Madagascar). More specifically, Beatrice Mary Chimwaza,
"Food and Nutritionin MalaWi"(Ph.D. thesis, Facultyof Science, University
of London, 1982) made anthropometricmeasurementson childrenin a rural
area (Dowa) and in a middle-class urban area (Lilongwe) and concluded
from the latter sample: "For height, weight, and arm circumference,the
results obtained in the present study seem to indicate that the international standardsused are appropriatefor assessing growth of the MalatCian
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